FLUX FLEET — INTEL BRIEFING №72

Period: 2026-11-03 07:32 – 2026-11-04 07:33 UTC (24h, day 70 of operations)
Sources: 8 honeypot nodes (frantech-ts also runs non-flux ssh/telnet honeypots whose condensed feed lands in /data/hp-logs and is NOT part of this report) — canary-farm-1 (EU-hot), ai-devbox-1 (EU), control-1 (differential baseline), ru-edge-1 (Russia), lauterbourg-01-ts (Nextcloud/php2shell TLS profile, rebuilt 10-23 15:06Z), netcup-ts + sponge-01-ts + frantech-ts (deception-only, no canaries)
Network layer: Arkime on spark (the fleet's own pcap sensors) — step 3c, the only view of sweeps that never request a path
Confidence: High (direct observation, 70-day baseline, mint and use sides verified against Tracebit alert logs; hostile bodies quoted verbatim where captured). Times quoted as stored digits; the ingest cast applies (see Fleet Observations).

BLUF

The credential funnel produced its first Bedrock-shaped use: a new self-use actor, 152.89.244.89 (aurologic GmbH, DE), minted 3 canaries on canary-farm-1 and worked one in the same window — 4 successful sts:GetCallerIdentity calls plus 10 denied operations led by bedrock:InvokeModel×5 and ListFoundationModels, with SSM, EC2, and IAM reads denied as well; nothing beyond account identity succeeded. XMLRPC-BRUTE returned from a new operator under the exact №67 record shape: 34.78.138.84 (Google LLC, BE) fired 10,000 system.multicall wp.getUsersBlogs POSTs at lauterbourg-01-ts in 4 minutes and owns the node's +324% day, while the previous operator (45.94.31.16) idled. Techoff (BG) ran its widest census on record — 195.178.110.247 crawled 6,709 paths on canary-farm-1 in 33 minutes, including ~6,000 .js.map source-map HEADs, owning the node's not-handled 11.1× spike — with three sibling IPs running three more shapes, all 0 mints. Mints held steady (83 digest-issued rows; 67 credentials to 41 collectors per Tracebit; 8×400 failures, no 401s) while MEGA-DICTIONARY idled and frantech-ts fell −97%. The network layer saw LIBSSH-MASSSWEEP contract to 183 IPs, OPSSH-UBUNTU-SWEEP present a swapped russh_0.45.0 banner under the same fingerprint, and GO-SSH-SWEEP re-cross the dispersed threshold. No fleet-side changes this cycle.

Key Judgements

  1. Stolen canary credentials are now being driven at LLM services, not just AWS inventory. The window's one use session paired 4 successful identity calls with 10 denied operations aimed at Bedrock (InvokeModel×5, ListFoundationModels), SSM (DescribeInstanceInformation), EC2 (DescribeInstances), and IAM (GetRole). (High confidence on the events — the Tracebit pull carries the operations and outcomes; Moderate on trajectory — one session from one IP, and Bedrock denials have №67 precedent via REGISTRY-HUNT; the new element is a census actor minting and working its own canaries in one window.)
  2. XMLRPC-BRUTE is commodity tooling with rotating operators, and the record-flood template circulates as a package. 34.78.138.84 repeated №67's artifact exactly — 10,000 multicall POSTs, 5 paths, forged Chrome/89.0.4389.114 — on a node and from an IP never used by the campaign before. (High confidence — byte-shape and UA match verified by journey query; the actor link is tooling-level, not organizational.)
  3. The census class keeps widening while the mint class absorbs none of it. Techoff's 6,709-path run is the widest config-census by path count in fleet history (prior census-class record: AI-CLI-VAULT's 1,438), yet it took 0 mints — every wide wordlist hit the tarpit/404 wall. (High confidence on the counts — direct per-IP queries; Moderate on the trend read — one window, one operator.)
  4. Hoards stay idle while use concentrates in a single self-use actor. 66 of 67 window credentials drew no AWS events; SI-CENSUS (56 per its 6-day Tracebit history) minted nothing Tracebit-side this window; the only use was the actor that minted the credential. (High confidence on the counts; Moderate on the hoard reading — №67–№68 showed use can lag mint by a day.)

Active Campaigns (day 70 status)

CREDENTIAL-DRAIN (mint→use pipeline) ⟳ — FIRST BEDROCK-SHAPE USE, SELF-USE — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 41 collector IPs took 67 credentials per the Tracebit funnel (digest issued rows: 83 — canary-farm-1 32 from 26 IPs, ai-devbox-1 28 from 23, control-1 12 from 10, ru-edge-1 11 from 10; the delta is the usual window-trim semantics). Use IP: 152.89.244.89 (new, self-use — see ACTUATOR-BEDROCK-KIT). Persistent hoards: SI-CENSUS 56/6d, 34.95.21.228 41, 45.148.10.120 12, 150.241.66.127 10, 46.148.227.131 7.
  • TTPs: mint side unchanged — /.env-class mints to hostile collectors; failures 8×400 pacing singles (canary-farm-1 3, ai-devbox-1 3, control-1 1, ru-edge-1 1), no 401s, no key errors. Use side: 14 events on 1 credential — 4× sts:GetCallerIdentity SUCCESS + 10 denied (InvokeModel×5, ListFoundationModels, SSM DescribeInstanceInformation, EC2 DescribeInstances, IAM GetRole; ListBuckets in the operation set).
  • Assessment: every issued row remains an operational credential within hours, and the deny wall held at identity-only. The escalation line is unchanged: any success beyond sts:GetCallerIdentity, or a write-shaped call, is the finding.

ACTUATOR-BEDROCK-KIT (mint-and-self-use kit) ⚠ NEW — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 152.89.244.89 (aurologic GmbH, DE) — canary-farm-1 only.
  • TTPs: a bare Mozilla/5.0 census of 151 events / 59 paths / 33 trap families: /@fs/etc/passwd Vite traversal, /containers/json docker daemon probe, and the full Spring actuator battery (env, configprops, heapdump, jolokia, mappings, beans) → 3 /.env mints → same-window AWS use of 1 minted canary (the 14-event session above).
  • Assessment: mint-then-work inside one window — the WEBSIPHON pattern (№55) with a different census surface and a Bedrock-shaped target list. The actuator battery suggests the actor reads Spring Boot metadata before anything else. Watch a retry, any success beyond identity, a write-shaped call, or a second IP/node.

XMLRPC-BRUTE ⟳ — OPERATOR SWAP, RECORD SHAPE ON LAUTERBOURG — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 34.78.138.84 (Google LLC, BE) — lauterbourg-01-ts only. №70–71's operator 45.94.31.16 (1337 Services GmbH, NL) idled: first miss after two consecutive windows.
  • TTPs: 10,008 events, 10,000 POSTs to /xmlrpc.php, every captured body a system.multicall wrapping wp.getUsersBlogs (head: <?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.multicall</methodName>…<string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string>…), forged Chrome/89.0.4389.114 — the №67 UA. 11:38–11:42 stored, ~42 POSTs/s for 4 minutes; plus php2shell-root×5, wlwmanifest, and wp-user-enum legs. Digest spike: wp-xmlrpc-post 10,000 vs 7-day avg 0 (inf) — the tag's first lauterbourg flood since the node's rebuild.
  • Assessment: the ninth operator class on record repeats the exact №67 artifact from a fresh Google-hosted IP on a fresh node — the flood kit circulates independently of any operator's schedule. The fake WordPress served every request; 0 mints, no captured credential success.

TECHOFF / PHPSWEEP kit ⟳ — NEW CENSUS ARM, FOUR LEGS — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 195.178.110.247, .22, .159 (all canary-farm-1) and .94 (lauterbourg-01-ts); all Techoff Srv Limited (BG), .247/.159 carry ipsum:1. Sibling .218 ran the GPU-discovery command pass on the frantech-ts honeypot (see SSH/telnet section).
  • TTPs: .247 — 6,888 events / 6,709 paths in 33 min (11:45–12:18 stored) under a malformed forgery (Chrome/123.0.0.0 + Safari/123.0.0.0): HEAD+GET pairs on /env.js, /environment.js, /config*.js (webapp-config-bundle-js 200s; the tag's 10.1× spike), then a ~6,000-path HEAD-only .js.map source-map crawl (404s; the node's not-handled 11.1×). .22 — 555 events in 1.06 s under Chrome/120, including a 230-path /wp-config.* backup-variant fanout and wp-plugin exploit paths (wp-symposium, kaswara). .159 — 768 events / 376 paths over 11 h under honest curl/7.81.0. .94 — 296 events / 292 paths in 3 min under Chrome/133. 0 mints across all four legs.
  • Assessment: the kit's census arm now spans config bundles, source maps, wp-config backups, plugin exploit paths, and slow honest-UA walks — the fleet's tarpit and 404 walls absorbed everything, and any future mint joins the drain. The .js.map class matters when it 200s: served source maps leak application structure.

CONFIGBUNDLE-KIT ⟳ — STANDING OPERATOR STILL MINTING — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 208.84.100.218 (on record since 10-02) — 5 mints across 3 sensors (canary-farm-1 2, ai-devbox-1 2, ru-edge-1 1), 5 per its 6-day history.
  • TTPs: family shape unchanged; the Techoff .247 run carried the same webapp-config-bundle-js family at record width (see TECHOFF above).
  • Assessment: five more credentials into the drain from the standing operator. AWS use remains the check; none observed.

VPN-CONF-HUNT ⟳ — LEGS CONTINUE, FIRST .14 MINT — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 85.155.14.15 (SolidCore Hosting LTD, DE) ran netcup-ts 356 events / 356 unique paths (Firefox/126 X11 forgery, 13:38–13:41 stored), then 85.155.14.14 ran ai-devbox-1 353 events / 353 paths / 47 families (Firefox/125 Win64 forgery, 21:10–21:14). Siblings .16/.32 absent.
  • TTPs: the registered cloud/VPN config census — the ai-devbox-1 kill-chain walk ran /.aws/credentials → aws_credentials.json → .aws/* variants → /.boto → /.azure/config → /.s3cfg; .14 minted 1 canary on ai-devbox-1 (the operator's first mint on this node).
  • Assessment: one wordlist, two nodes, ~7.5 h apart; the operator now collects, and its canary joins the drain with 0 observed use.

REGISTRY-HUNT ⟳ — L9SCAN MINT ARM RETURNED — Hostile, active

SI-CENSUS ⟳ — VOLUME COLLAPSED — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 102.220.163.241 (VPS Dedicated LLC, SI) — 1,048 events across 3 sensors (control-1 514 + ru-edge-1 514 census passes plus ~20 light on ai-devbox-1), down from 5,661 across 4 last window.
  • TTPs: the 511-path directory-fanout census, unchanged; 2 digest-issued mints (control-1, ru-edge-1, 1 each) — none inside the Tracebit per-collector window; the 6-day persistent view holds the hoard at 56 mints (last placed 2026-11-03 02:45).
  • Assessment: the fleet's largest standing hoard with zero observed AWS use keeps its inventory; a second consecutive low-volume window would mark a shift in the operator's schedule rather than a one-off.

MALWARE-DICT ⟳ — .18 LOOP RETURNED — Hostile, active

  • Actors: 204.76.203.18 (Pfcloud UG, NL, ipsum:2) — control-1 only.
  • TTPs: 1,837 events / 579 paths under an EMPTY user agent, 07:43 11-03 → 06:09 11-04 stored — the №14 continuous-loop replay shape; 0 mints; /24 siblings .10/.7/.50 absent.
  • Assessment: the Pfcloud replay loop is back on its original host and target node after a long idle stretch; same dictionary scale (~579 paths), same GET-only shape.

ENV-FANOUT ⟳ (watch) — LIGHT RETURN

  • Actors: 198.145.226.37 (M247 Europe SRL, US) — 105 events across canary-farm-1 + lauterbourg-01-ts; 162.216.241.239 (Dynu Systems, US) absent.
  • TTPs: light touches only; the registered 85-path <dir>/.env fanout did not re-run at №71 volume.
  • Assessment: the Chrome/143-forgery pair's second IP returned at low volume. The promotion triggers stand: a third IP, any mint, or the forged UA reaching a canary node.

Light watchers

  • SS-PROBE — sixth operator. 102.22.219.226 (8-sensor looper, python-requests/2.31.0 unchanged) ran the fresh-marker → /.env mint cycle across all 4 canary sensors: 6 mints (ai-devbox-1 3, control-1/ru-edge-1/canary-farm-1 1 each), 0 AWS use. The ledger is now 6 operators, one TTP.
  • 158.140.191.104 (PT. Eka Mas Republik, ID; forged Chrome/124) — 525 events / 85 paths on control-1 with 3 /.env mints; journey: tarpit loops → /.env.local//.env.production errors → /.env issued. Third-largest mint count this window.
  • 185.190.54.150 — honest self-label Authorized-Audit/1.0; 410 events / 262 paths across sponge-01-ts, lauterbourg-01-ts, canary-farm-1, and 2 mints on canary-farm-1. The №71 VantageResearch class: research label, mint behavior.
  • GIT-HARVEST — third consecutive window: 35.232.76.162, 80 events / 4 sensors (netcup, lauterbourg, control, canary-farm) under the honest harvest/1.0 UA; 0 mints. Scheduled, not one-off.
  • TOKEN-CRAWLER — 45.198.224.230/.235/.236 ran the /c/<96-char random-token> path class on ru-edge-1 (20+20+10 events, forged Chrome/114 per IP; the digest's ru-edge /c/ first-seens), plus .125's all-8 looper pass (82 events). 0 mints.
  • Tarpit loopers — 89.248.172.33 (7 sensors, 394 events), 93.174.93.12 (6 sensors, 374), 91.92.40.12 (8 sensors, 348 over 2 paths), 45.198.224.125 (8 sensors, 82).
  • BUCKLOG-KIT census arm — 185.177.72.64: 4 mints this window (canary-farm-1 2, ru-edge-1 2), 6 per its 6-day history; use side idle.
  • 137.23.38.53 (SES-QUOTA-PROBE) — present light (98 events on ai-devbox-1 + control-1), no use events this window after four consecutive use windows.
  • Benign/research — Censys-class 71.6.155.70 (8 sensors, handshake-shaped), 94.183.174.99 (8 sensors, 24 events), 91.224.92.45 (6 sensors) held benign shapes. On the HoneyDB layer, the /.env crypto-lure fetch from 70.8.208.88 is the operator's own validation client (benign by identification, per the registry); a loopback 127.0.0.1 hit is internal. No benign-listed operator crossed into hostile behavior.

Standing actors (persistence check)

  • SI-CENSUS (102.220.163.241) — present every recent window; volume collapsed this window (1,048 vs 5,661); hoard 56/6d, zero use ever observed.
  • Techoff blocks (195.178.110.x, BG) — tenth-plus window; the kit debuted a four-leg census arm and touched the honeypot layer via .218.
  • REGISTRY-HUNT DigitalOcean pool — present every window on record; l9scan mint arm returned with 2 mints, use side idle.
  • Pfcloud 204.76.203.18 (MALWARE-DICT) — loop returned to control-1 after idle windows; continuous shape.
  • 208.84.100.218 (CONFIGBUNDLE-KIT) — standing since 10-02; 5 mints this window, 5/6d.
  • 85.155.14.x (VPN-CONF-HUNT) — sixth-plus window; first .14 mint.
  • 35.232.76.162 (GIT-HARVEST) — third consecutive window, same shape.
  • 185.177.72.64 (BUCKLOG census) — minting across two sensors, 6/6d.
  • 137.23.38.53 (SES-QUOTA-PROBE) — mint-side presence light; use side silent after four consecutive use windows.
  • 45.198.224.x (TOKEN-CRAWLER) — /24 rotating; /c/ class back on ru-edge-1.

Network-layer recon (Arkime)

Network-layer recon (Arkime) — 2026-11-03 07:32:00 → 2026-11-04 07:33:28 UTC

Fingerprint field ssh.hassh, destination port 22 · 108,812 inbound sessions · fleet IPs: ai-devbox-1 217.15.163.226, canary-farm-1 109.123.246.142, control-1 38.54.2.209, frantech-ts 209.141.62.110, lauterbourg-01-ts 89.116.25.211, netcup-ts 159.195.21.150, ru-edge-1 130.94.89.46, sponge-01-ts 89.167.72.144

Session tags: honeypot 80,309, bahrain-sponge-01-ts 57,854, sensor:bahrain-sponge-01-ts 57,854, contabo-sponge-02-ts 11,633, proxy 11,633, sensor:contabo-sponge-02-ts 11,633

client fingerprint sessions src IPs networks countries ports first → last shape
f555226df1963d1d3c09daf865abdc9a 1,553 183 106 44 22 2026-11-03 07:46 → 2026-11-04 07:23 dispersed sweep (one port, many networks)
184781a96d49ee509a431028a8d5022a 1,623 118 78 37 22 2026-11-03 07:32 → 2026-11-04 07:22 dispersed sweep (one port, many networks)
0a07365cc01fa9fc82608ba4019af499 24,551 60 29 17 22 2026-11-03 07:32 → 2026-11-04 07:22 dispersed sweep (one port, many networks)
16443846184eafde36765c9bab2f4397 14,284 37 20 15 22 2026-11-03 07:32 → 2026-11-04 07:18 single-source
084386fa7ae5039bcf6f07298a05a227 39 32 7 9 22 2026-11-03 07:40 → 2026-11-04 05:34 single-source
03a80b21afa810682a776a7d42e5e6fb 176 28 16 4 22 2026-11-03 08:10 → 2026-11-04 07:24 single-source
dd9bcf093c355da7000132131cb36fd0 30 28 1 1 22 2026-11-03 10:07 → 2026-11-04 04:47 single-source
e54ef3ec27fe1fea7ab64d3fa05359fd 40 20 7 5 22 2026-11-03 08:24 → 2026-11-04 06:11 single-source

Flagged sweeps (3) — one fingerprint, many networks, single port, no authentication attempted:

  • f555226df1963d1d3c09daf865abdc9a — client banner ssh-2.0-libssh_0.9.6, 1,553 sessions from 183 source IPs across 106 networks in 44 countries, port 22, avg 4,922 B/session. Networks: AS8075 Microsoft Corporation, AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH, AS16276 OVH SAS, AS4766 Korea Telecom, AS31898 Oracle Corporation. Busiest sources: 163.227.161.160, 171.244.39.95, 203.160.52.177, 150.5.141.198, 189.165.23.212. Last 7 days: 10-29 657 IPs, 10-30 583 IPs, 10-31 455 IPs, 11-01 610 IPs, 11-02 496 IPs, 11-03 149 IPs, 11-04 66 IPs.
  • 184781a96d49ee509a431028a8d5022a — client banner ssh-2.0-russh_0.45.0, 1,623 sessions from 118 source IPs across 78 networks in 37 countries, port 22, avg 4,503 B/session. Networks: AS12714 PJSC MegaFon, AS9198 JSC Kazakhtelecom, AS137718 Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd., AS51167 Contabo GmbH, AS16276 OVH SAS. Busiest sources: 80.68.76.181, 88.204.245.66, 115.190.174.152, 85.214.167.83, 176.235.120.48. Last 7 days: 11-02 185 IPs, 11-03 118 IPs, 11-04 4 IPs.
  • 0a07365cc01fa9fc82608ba4019af499 — client banner ssh-2.0-go, 24,551 sessions from 60 source IPs across 29 networks in 17 countries, port 22, avg 5,138 B/session. Networks: AS198364 Banatsync Srl, AS209854 Cyberzone S.A., AS205089 Alfahost LLC, AS213790 Limited Network LTD, AS211486 Alferov Aleksey Aleksandrovich. Busiest sources: 77.239.124.153, 77.239.124.155, 109.160.32.45, 109.160.32.108, 109.160.32.128. Last 7 days: 10-29 58 IPs, 10-30 83 IPs, 10-31 79 IPs, 11-01 73 IPs, 11-02 65 IPs, 11-03 62 IPs, 11-04 30 IPs.

Thresholds: dispersed = ≥50 source IPs and ≥20 networks on one port; mass = ≥200 source IPs. Fingerprint identity, never source IP: sweep operators rotate addresses and keep the tool.

Recon read: two registration-level changes this window. OPSSH-UBUNTU-SWEEP (184781a96d49…) presented banner ssh-2.0-russh_0.45.0 where №71 recorded openssh_9.6p1 ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20 — same fingerprint, new banner: tooling migration or spoofing on an identical KEX set — and contracted (118 IPs in-window, 4 on the 11-04 tail). GO-SSH-SWEEP (0a07365cc01f…) re-crossed the dispersed threshold at 60 IPs while its session count fell −12,657; sources concentrated (77.239.124.x, 109.160.32.x busiest — the same /24s as prior windows' frantech uname-survey). LIBSSH-MASSSWEEP contracted to 183 IPs (−181). GO-SCATTER-SWEEP held 14,284 sessions at 37 IPs. No new fingerprints; CTL-MASS-SSH (4e066189c3bb…) ran its fourth consecutive ≥27k window (31,147 sessions) and control-1 still takes the fleet's heaviest inbound load (57,854 sessions).

Fleet Observations

  • Volume shifts, explained. lauterbourg-01-ts +324% (13,059 vs 3,077 7-day avg) on 34.78.138.84's 10,000-POST flood (10,008 of the node's events). frantech-ts −97% (517 vs 15,183) on MEGA-DICTIONARY's absence — no replay this window. ai-devbox-1 −56% (2,491): XMLRPC's 45.94.31.16 idle, SI-CENSUS down, MEGA-DICT absent. ru-edge-1 −67% (1,169): SI-CENSUS down, no heavy census. canary-farm-1 −23% (10,918) despite the Techoff arms adding ~8,200 events — №70–71's heavies (WIDE-CONFIG-CENSUS, METADATA-HUNT runners, XFF-SWARM) were all absent. control-1 +40% (3,715) on MALWARE-DICT's 1,837, 158.140.191.104's 525, and the walker pool. netcup-ts −23% / sponge-01-ts −16% are mild deception-node drift. Coverage verified: every sensor's latest event in v_full lands 11-04 10:51–12:22 UTC, so the drops are real, not sync gaps. Window overlap applies as always — events between digest runs appear in two digests.
  • Canary economics. Digest issued rows: 83 (canary-farm-1 32 from 26 IPs, ai-devbox-1 28 from 23, control-1 12 from 10, ru-edge-1 11 from 10). Failures: 8×400 pacing singles (canary-farm-1 3, ai-devbox-1 3, control-1 1, ru-edge-1 1); no 401s, no key errors. The Tracebit funnel (client-side window trim, as every cycle) counts 67 credentials to 41 collectors, 1 credential used in AWS (14 events: 4× sts:GetCallerIdentity SUCCESS + 10 denied), 66 idle.
  • Attribution/TLS posture. 2,563 requests carried X-Forwarded-For; multi-entry chains 0; XFF-ignored 7; single-entry forgery 0 — the fourth straight quiet window. TLS ran http-led on every node; canary-farm-1's HTTPS (865) ran far under its HTTP (10,053). Top vhost Host headers: cloud.wafflehouseindex.us 11,631 (lauterbourg-01-ts, inflated by the flood), sso.rightabouteverything.show 1,168, inference.fapthropic.com 867. The retired kiteworks.rightabouteverything.show name drew no top-10 volume this window (№71: 706) — stale-wordlist SNI traffic did not return.
  • Control-1 discovery velocity. 52 days live (first event 2026-09-12 07:59 UTC). The window's full day (11-04) ran 3,715 events / 127 unique IPs — inside the 7-day band (1,179–5,138 events, 104–155 IPs) and +40% against the 7-day event average, on MALWARE-DICT, the 158.140.191.104 census, and the walkers. The network layer still points the fleet's heaviest single-fingerprint SSH load at this node (CTL-MASS-SSH, 31,147 sessions; 4th consecutive ≥27k window).
  • First-seen caveats. All first-seen rows share one sync-batch timestamp (02:15 / 02:31 stored), so they are an inventory, not a timeline. Attribution by journey query: the /wp-config.* backup-variant fanout and wp-plugin exploit paths belong to Techoff .22's 1.06-second burst; the ru-edge /c/<96-char> random paths belong to TOKEN-CRAWLER's 45.198.224.230/.235/.236.
  • HoneyDB layer (ch-sponge-01-ts — platform API, pcaps separate in Arkime). 2,817 records / 957 sessions / 183 sources since 2026-11-03T07:34Z. Top services: Telnet 907 records, HTTP 719, MoneroRPC.wallet 457. Top sources: 20.164.200.48 (368 records), 193.32.249.162 (326), 169.150.196.5 (226). Event classes include cve_attempt 21, key_exfil_attempt 5, transfer_attempt 8; 3 /.env crypto-lure requests (70.8.208.88 — the operator's own validation client, benign per the registry; one loopback; one 13.140.235.56); 1 Docker dropper_indicators event (220.181.1.163).
  • Fleet-side fixes. None this cycle — no service, config, or fleet changes were made.

SSH/telnet honeypot (frantech-ts — single sensor, not fleet-wide)

One host, one view — never a fleet number. Funnel: 317 sources sent credentials → 204 got a shell (64%) → 151 ran a command (74% of shell-getters, 48% of sources). Event level: 8,188 credential attempts → 3,363 accepted logins → 10,050 commands (299% of accepted logins go on to run something). Telnet (commodity IoT botnets): 467 attempts.

New commands: zero (0 of 4,494 distinct) — a third quiet window; operators re-ran known tooling only. New credential pairs: 0 of 3,656 offered. Concentration moved: rootssssss23424123123/rootssssss23424123123 is the new top pair (175 attempts), and the gs5662d34 family rotated elongated variants (root/root3245gs5662d34111111111 149, 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34 111, root/3245gs5662d34 87), then commodity pairs (root/123456 87, pi/raspberry 69, user/wasd 62).

Recurring commands are context: the uname -s -v -n -r -m + uname -m | awk discovery loop (1,927 + 1,927 events from 3 IPs, example source 109.160.32.47 — the GO-SSH-SWEEP /24), the chattr -ia .ssh/lockr -ia .ssh + SSH-key-plant pair (297 + 241 events from 114 and 100 sources, example source 223.221.38.226), and a GPU-discovery pass from 195.178.110.218 (/bin/./uname, nvidia-smi -q | grep "Product Name", lspci | grep VGA legs, 157 events each) — the same Techoff org that ran this window's HTTP census arm, working the honeypot layer.

C2 / payload endpoints (frantech-ts ssh+telnet honeypot)

Single sensor (one host), not a fleet number. Built from the raw honeypot sources — session transcripts, honeypot.log, and the capture vault — because the condensed /data/hp-logs/ feed truncates commands at 160 characters and drops any dropper line whose URL sits past that offset.

Summary

New this window

endpoint cmd events 2xx src IPs first seen last seen payload
http://5.175.192.232/bot_mips 2 2 1 2026-11-04T00:22 2026-11-04T00:22 afdbab3c1c43

Endpoints active this window

endpoint cmd events 2xx src IPs first seen last seen payload
http://5.175.192.232/bot_mips 2 2 1 2026-11-04T00:22 2026-11-04T00:22 afdbab3c1c43
http://160.119.66.206/bins/kla.sh 528 0 1 2026-09-18T10:45 2026-11-04T06:00 —
https://217.60.102.5/sh 20 0 10 2026-10-28T06:54 2026-11-04T06:05 —

Payload artifacts (HTTP 2xx, captured)

sha256 size type endpoint first fetched
7b8cd695424f 1487 script http://176.65.139.40/wget.sh 2026-10-20T08:57
b965f772177c 1488 script http://176.65.139.40/curl.sh 2026-10-20T08:57
62e3e86a7586 201396 elf http://152.42.195.115/main_arm7 2026-10-26T08:46
ec69d3e0d4d9 194400 elf http://152.42.195.115/main_mips 2026-10-26T08:46
1913ed2ad175 194400 elf http://152.42.195.115/main_mpsl 2026-10-26T08:46
e27e963b2b49 157468 elf http://152.42.195.115/main_arm6 2026-10-26T08:46
ba9c9d9d361d 1615 script http://176.65.139.157/telnet2.sh 2026-10-12T16:52
cf0b50b8b7a8 1476 script http://45.90.163.37/wget.sh 2026-10-31T11:22
a8db671b58d0 1477 script http://45.90.163.37/curl.sh 2026-10-31T11:22
2165fae6c486 6738 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T11:17
2d6b9901a480 14042 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T12:21
2a7af0bb942a 14506 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T12:46
a8769ddc8139 16170 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T14:04
f8d4dafd6b96 16506 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T16:45
8a8189c0c67b 5150 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T17:37
c871a756510b 5276 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/t2r_compat.sh 2026-10-26T19:22
0cac28cc7f78 4404 script http://146.190.102.83/t2r/w1_compat.sh 2026-10-27T00:18
e06be431a8d4 1498 script http://185.228.72.128/wget.sh 2026-10-19T21:30
72d835f767c8 1499 script http://185.228.72.128/curl.sh 2026-10-19T21:30
0583d9e18684 1987 script http://176.65.132.7:8889/lv.sh 2026-10-24T10:16
b16e15764b8b 19 text http://176.65.132.7:8889/lv.sh 2026-10-24T10:16
afdbab3c1c43 2425015 elf http://5.175.192.232/bot_mips 2026-11-04T00:22
709009e02c8e 10 text http://oper.atlas101.us.kg/dl.sh 2026-10-15T04:36

Host != actor: a staging host can also be the operator's login source (176.65.139.40 authenticates 1,224 times). Correlate on payload sha256 and script text, not on the IP.

Family note: the window's one C2 change is a new staging host — http://5.175.192.232/bot_mips served a 2,425,015-byte payload (sha256 afdbab3c1c43aceaeb9117c725e8c6f5db89eafbda2ee18f958d02d2bde30e95) twice to 1 source at 2026-11-04T00:22Z. Read read-only on the node: ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS32, statically linked, Go 1.22.5 build ID, stripped; no plaintext URLs or repository paths were extractable from the binary, so the family is unresolved — the /bot_mips name and 2.4 MB size say IoT bot, the toolchain says Go rather than the usual C families. The long-lived kla.sh fetcher (live since 09-18, 528 command events this window, still 0 downloads served) and the LIBREDTAIL staging path https://217.60.102.5/sh (20 attempts from 10 IPs, serves nothing) were the only other active endpoints; no other new endpoints or served payloads.

Gaps / Next Collection

  1. 152.89.244.89's next AWS session. The deny wall held at identity. Watch for a retry from this IP, any success beyond sts:GetCallerIdentity, and a write-shaped call — the line №71 drew. Its 2 unused mints expire on the normal clock.
  2. The XMLRPC-BRUTE record kit's schedule. Will 34.78.138.84 repeat on a third node, and does 45.94.31.16 return? A third same-shape run confirms the flood kit as a circulating commodity with its own rotation.
  3. Techoff .247's source-map class. All ~6,000 .js.map HEADs drew 404s; served maps would leak application structure. Watch for a second node, any 200, and any mint from the arm.
  4. SS-PROBE's sixth operator. 102.22.219.226 holds 6 fresh canaries with 0 observed use. Any Tracebit alert naming it extends the operator ledger's use side.
  5. OPSSH-UBUNTU-SWEEP's banner swap. Same fingerprint, new banner (russh_0.45.0). A third banner supports the spoofing read; a stable russh client supports the migration read. Any auth attempt reclassifies the sweep toward the spray class.
  6. MEGA-DICTIONARY's circulation test. Idle this window. A fourth host replaying the 14,864-path manifest would establish active circulation; a second consecutive idle window opens the pause question.

Visuals: /data/flux-logs/reports/flux-fleet-visuals-2026-11-04-r2.html
Plain language: /data/flux-logs/reports/flux-fleet-intel-briefing-plain-2026-11-04.md